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The question of what should determine the boundaries between public and private firms in an advanced 
capitalist economy is a highly topical one. In this paper I discuss some recent theoretical thinking on 
this issue. I divide the paper into two parts. First, I make some general remarks about the relationship 
between the theoretical literature of privatization and incomplete contracting theories of the firm. 
Second, I use some of the ideas from this literature to develop a very preliminary model of public-
private partnerships. 
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1.  Parallels between theories of the firm and of privatization 
Let me begin by discussing the very close parallel between the theory of the firm and the theory 
of privatization.1   In the vertical integration literature one considers two firms, A and B.  A might be a 
car manufacturer and B might supply car-body parts.   Suppose that there is some reason for A and B 
to have a long-term relationship (e.g., A or B must make a 
relationship-specific investment).  Then there are two principal ways in which this relationship 
can be conducted.  A and B can have an arms-length contract, but remain as independent firms; or A 
and B can merge and carry out the transaction within a single firm.  The analogous question in the 
privatization literature is the following.  Suppose A represents the government and B represents a firm 
supplying the government or society with some service.  B could be an electricity company (supplying 
consumers) or a prison (incarcerating criminals).  Then again, there are two principal ways in which this 
relationship can be conducted.  A and B can have a contract, with B remaining as a private firm, or the 
government can buy (nationalize) B. 
There are, of course, some important differences between the two situations.  First, if B is an 
electricity company, it will likely have direct dealings with consumers, independent of its relationship with 
the government.  In this case the contract the government has with a private electricity company can be 
thought of as an attempt to regulate the company’s dealings with consumers.  There is no obvious 
analogy in the case of vertical integration.  Second, decisions to privatize or nationalize are often highly 
political, presumably because of the government’s unique position in society, whereas vertical integration 
decisions are usually strictly economic.  Third, the government is often thought of as a very different 
agent from a private firm: it is concerned with social welfare rather than just profit.  Here, however, the  
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distinction is less sharp than it might seem at first sight since there are a number of firms (particularly 
nonprofits or cooperatives) that have broader concerns than just profits. 
In spite of these differences, the issues of vertical integration and privatization have much more 
in common than not.  Both are concerned with whether it is better to regulate a relationship via an arms-
length contract or via a transfer of ownership.  Given this, one might have expected the literatures to 
have developed along similar lines.  However, this is not so.  Whereas much of the recent literature on 
the theory of the firm takes an “incomplete” contracting perspective, in which inefficiencies arise because 
it is hard to foresee and contract about the uncertain future, much of the privatization literature has taken 
a “complete” contracting perspective, in which imperfections arise solely because of moral hazard or 
asymmetric information. 
My own view is that this is unfortunate.  One of the insights of the recent literature on the firm is 
that, if the only imperfections are those arising from moral hazard or asymmetric information, 
organizational form--including ownership and firm boundaries--does not matter: an owner has no special 
power or rights since everything is specified in an initial contract (at least among the things that can ever 
be specified).  In contrast, ownership does matter when contracts are incomplete: the owner of an asset 
or firm can then make all decisions concerning the asset or firm that are not included in an initial contract 
(the owner has “residual control rights”). 
Applying this insight to the privatization context yields the conclusion that in a complete 
contracting world the government does not need to own a firm to control its behavior: any goals--
economic or otherwise--can be achieved via a detailed initial contract.  However, if contracts are 
incomplete, as they are in practice, there is a case for the government to own an electricity company or  
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prison since ownership gives the government special powers in the form of residual control rights. 
Even if this position is accepted, it does not follow that one can take an “off the shelf” model 
from the theory of the firm literature and apply it to privatization.  In the standard “property rights” 
model found in that literature, ownership serves to elicit appropriate ex ante investments, particularly 
those in human capital.2   If firm A acquires firm B, then A, having more residual control rights, has 
greater bargaining power when uncontracted-for contingencies arise; A earns a greater return on her 
investment and therefore invests more.  Conversely, B’s incentive to invest falls since B’s bargaining 
power is lower.  The optimal allocation of ownership trades off these two effects.   
Applying this logic to the privatization context, one concludes that, if the government buys an 
electricity company or prison, the benefit is that some government bureaucrat who is in charge of the 
prison will invest more (have more ideas, be more entrepreneurial); but the cost is that the manager of 
the prison--who used to be an owner but is now an employee--will invest less.  The latter effect--that a 
government employee will be less entrepreneurial than an owner-manager--seems very plausible, but the 
idea that government ownership leads to more entrepreneurship by bureaucrats seems less so. 
For this reason the literature has explored other trade-offs.3   Consider, for example, the model 
in Hart et al (1997) (HSV).  HSV compare two cases.  (1) The government can own a facility, a prison, 
say, and employ a manager to run it; or (2) the government can contract with a company owned by the 
prison manager to run the prison for a period of time.  HSV ignore investments on the government side, 
but suppose that the prison manager can make two kinds of investment.  He can invest in efficiency-
enhancing ideas that raise the quality of prison services, e.g., develop new rehabilitation programs; he 
can also spend time figuring out how to cut costs and quality, while staying within the letter of the  
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contract.  A government employee has little incentive to engage in either activity since it is easy for the 
government (as owner) to “hold up” the employee without rewarding him appropriately.  In contrast, a 
private prison owner-manager is less subject to hold up.  The good news about this is that private 
ownership encourages the first, innovative type of investment.  The bad news is that private ownership 
also encourages the second, quality-shading kind of investment.  The choice between public and private 
ownership depends on which of these effects is more important. 
In summary, the HSV model differs from the standard property rights model of the firm in two 
ways.  First, only one party (the prison manager) invests, but he makes two kinds of investments (as in 
the multi-tasking model of Holmstrom-Milgrom (1991)).  Second, the contract between the government 
and the prison provider plays a crucial role--it defines the extent to which quality shading can occur.  In 
contrast, in the standard property rights model, long-term contracts are assumed to be sufficiently 
incomplete to be useless. 
 
2.  Public-private partnerships (PPPs) 
In this section, I use an HSV-type model to understand the costs and benefits of public-private 
partnerships.4    To repeat what I said in the introduction, this model is extremely preliminary.  For 
simplicity, I will now ignore the choice between public and private ownership and assume that all 
provision is private.  I will take a key property of a PPP to be that facility construction and service 
provision are bundled, i.e., in the case of a prison the government contracts with a private party--
henceforth known as the “builder”--to build and run the prison (the builder may then subcontract with 
someone else to run the prison).5  In contrast, under “conventional” provision, the government contracts  
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with the builder to build the prison and then later on with another (private) party to run it.  
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The government and builder contract at date 0, the prison is built between dates 0 and 1, and the prison 
is operated between dates 1 and 2.  (There is no discounting.)  The contract specifies either the basic 
characteristics of the prison that should be delivered at date 1 (in the case of conventional provision) or 
the basic prison services that should be provided between dates 1 and 2 (in the case of a PPP).6   In 
each case the contract is assumed to be incomplete in the sense that the builder can modify the nature of 
the prison or the nature of prison services in various ways, without violating the contract.  Specifically, 
the builder can make two investments, i, e, that have consequences for the costs and benefits of running 
the prison between dates 1 and 2.  We write  
 
B = B0 + ß(i) - b(e),  
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C = C0 - ?(i) - c(e), 
 
where ß, b, ?, c > 0, ß¢ > 0, b¢ > 0, ?¢ > 0, c¢ > 0, ß† < 0, b† > 0, ?† < 0, c† < 0.  Here B represents 
the (unverifiable) benefit to society (measured in money) from running the prison and C represents the 
(unverifiable) costs from doing so (borne by the prison operator).  The builder’s total investment costs 
equal i + e. 
We can interpret these investments as follows.  Investment i is a productive investment that 
makes the prison more attractive and easier to run (it raises B and reduces C)--it could correspond to a 
higher quality / more pleasant / airier building.  In contrast, e is an unproductive investment that reduces 
total costs and quality.  It corresponds to the quality-shading investment in HSV.  For example, in the 
process of building the prison, the builder might realize that he can install an electric fence that reduces 
the likelihood of escapes.  This reduces prison operating costs since fewer guards have to be hired, but 
may not be what the government had in mind (it reduces quality).    
In the first-best, i and e are chosen to maximize net benefit, B - C - i - e, i.e., 
 
B0 + ß(i) - b(e) - C0 + ?(i) + c(e) - i - e. 
 
The first-order conditions are   
 
ß¢ (i*) + ?¢(i*) = 1, 
c¢(e*) -  b¢(e*) £ 1 with equality if e* > 0.  
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We will assume that c¢(0) -  b¢(0) £ 1, i.e., e is socially unproductive.  This means that we get a corner 
solution in the first-best: e* = 0.  (In contrast, all other first-order conditions are supposed to have 
interior solutions.) 
We now consider the second-best, where the builder’s investments are nonverifiable and hence 
can’t be contracted on.  We assume, however, that the provider of prison services observes i, e; in 
particular, he knows what his costs will be.  We compare two cases. 
Case 1:  Separate contracts to build and operate, or “unbundling” 
In this case, the government contracts with a builder at date 0 to build a basic prison for price 
P0.  At date 1 the government auctions off the contract to operate the prison.  If there is a competitive 
supply of contractors, the government will pay the prison operator a price equal to his operating cost C 
= C 0 - ?( ) - c( ), where  ,   are the builder’s equilibrium choices of i, e .  At date 0, the builder 
chooses i, e to solve: 
 
Max P0 - i - e. 
 
The solution is extremely simple:   =   = 0.    That is, the builder builds the cheapest prison possible 
(while staying within the contract).  Note that, although i, e affect the operating contract price the 
government has to pay, the builder does not internalize this externality.7   
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If there is a competitive supply of builders, P0 =    +   = 0, and so the government’s net 
payoff is  
 
B - C - P0 = B - C - i - e, evaluated at   =   = 0. 
 
Case 2: PPP, or “bundling” 
In this case the government offers a contract at date 0 that specifies the basic quality of the 
service to be provided between dates 1 and 2 and a price P.  Now the builder internalizes the cost of 
service provision since either he provides the service himself or he subcontracts the service (in the latter 
case, given competition, he will pay the subcontractor a price equal to the subcontractor’s cost, C = C0 
- ?(i) - c(e)). 
At date 0 the builder chooses i, e to solve: 
 
Max P - C - i - e = P - C0 + ?(i) + c(e) - i - e. 
 
The first order conditions are 
 
?¢( ) = 1, 
c¢( ) = 1.  
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If there is a competitive supply of builders, P = C + i + e, and so the government’s net payoff is  
 
B - P =  B - C - i - e, now evaluated at i =  , e =   . 
 
The PPP equilibrium is illustrated in Fig. 2 along with the first-best and the unbundling 
equilibrium. 
   
 
  Fig. 2: Illustration of Equilibria 
 
The trade-off between unbundling and bundling is simple.  Under unbundling, the builder 
internalizes neither the social benefit B nor the operating cost C.  By setting i = e = 0, he does too little  
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of the productive investment, i, but the right amount of the unproductive investment, e.  In contrast, 
under bundling or PPP, the builder again does not internalize B, but does internalize C.  As a result, he 
does more of the productive investment, although still too little, but also more of the unproductive 
investment.8 
The model yields a simple conclusion.  Conventional provision (“unbundling”) is good if the 
quality of the building can be well specified, whereas the quality of the service can’t be.  Under these 
conditions, underinvestment in i under conventional provision is not a serious issue, whereas 
overinvestment in e under PPP may be.  In contrast, PPP is good if the quality of the service can be well 
specified in the initial contract (or, more generally, there are good performance measures which can be 
used to reward or penalize the service provider), whereas the quality of the building can’t be.  Under 
these conditions, underinvestment in i under conventional provision may be a serious issue, while 
overinvestment in e under PPP is not.9   
It is worth being a little speculative.  Arguably, prisons and schools fall into the first category: 
contracting on the building is relatively simple, while contracting on the service may not be.  On the other 
hand, hospitals may fall into the second category: although specifying service quality is far from 
straightforward, it may be easier to come up with reasonable performance measures concerning how 
patients are treated than it is to specify what may be a very complex building. 
 
3.  Final comments 
In this paper I have discussed some recent  theoretical thinking on public versus private 
ownership, and I have developed a simple incomplete contracting model to analyze PPPs.  The model  
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suggests that the choice between PPPs and conventional provision turns on whether it is easier to write 
contracts on service provision than on building provision.  
Note that, although perhaps not surprising, this conclusion is at odds with much current thinking 
by policy makers.  Policy makers frequently argue that PPPs are good because the private sector is a 
cheaper source of financing or insurance than the public sector.  This thinking is strange for an economist 
since it is hard to imagine an agent that is more able to borrow or to provide insurance than the 
government (with its enormous powers of taxation).  One of the (modest) benefits of the current paper 
is that it may shift attention from what seem to be secondary financing issues to what seems to be the 
central issue: (relative) contracting costs. 
Our model could be usefully extended in various ways.  The model takes the length of contract 
as given--implicitly it is assumed that the world ends at date 2.  As a result, it does not matter who owns 
the asset (prison) at the end of the contract.  With more periods, both contract length and who owns the 
asset after the contract ends become interesting choice variables. 
The model could also be applied outside the public-private context.  For example, it may throw 
light on the choice a purchaser in the private sector faces between hiring a general contractor to do a 
job and contracting separately with specialists.  It may also provide ingredients for a general analysis of 
optimal contract length between (private) firms--an issue about which economists have had remarkably 
little to say.10  
  12 
  REFERENCES 
Bennett, J. and Iossa, E. (2002), ‘Building and managing facilities for public services,’ (January) 
  Brunel University, mimeo. 
Bentz, A., Grout, P. A., and Halonen, M.. (2002), ‘Public private partnerships: what should the  
  state buy?’ (March) Dartmouth College, mimeo. 
Besley, T. and Ghatak, M. (2001),  ‘Government versus private ownership of public goods,’
  Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 116(4), pp. 1343-72. 
Ellman, M. (1999), ‘Essays on the economics of organizations,’ Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard 
  University. 
Grout, P. A. (1997) ‘The economics of the private finance initiative,’ Oxford Review of  
  Economic Policy, vol. 13(4), pp. 53-66. 
Hart, O. (1995),  Firms, Contracts, and Financial Structure.  Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hart, O., Shleifer, A., and Vishny, R. W. (1997), ‘The proper scope of government: theory and 
  an application to prisons,’ Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 112(4), pp. 1126-61. 
Holmstrom, B. and Milgrom, P. (1991), ‘Multi-task principal-agent analyses: incentive  
  contracts, asset ownership and job design,’ Journal of Law, Economics and  
  Organization, vol. VII , pp. 24-52. 
King, S. and Pitchford, R. (2001), ‘Private or public? A taxonomy of optimal ownership and 
  management regimes,’ (July), Australian National University, mimeo. 
Laffont, J-J., and Tirole, J. (1993),  A Theory of Incentives in Regulation and Procurement.  
  Cambridge: MIT Press.  
  13 
Schmidt, K. (1996), ‘The costs and benefits of privatization: An incomplete contracts approach,’ 
  Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, vol. XII,  pp. 1-24. 
Shleifer, A. (1998),  ‘State versus private ownership,’ Journal of Economic Perspectives,  
vol. 12(4) (Fall) pp. 133-5 
  14 
 
  ENDNOTES 
 
 
                                                  
1. For an excellent recent summary of thinking about privatization, see Shleifer (1998). 
2. For a summary of the property rights literature, see Hart (1995).  
3. For some representative contributions, see Schmidt (1996), Laffont and Tirole (1993), Besley and 
Ghatak (2001), and King and Pitchford (2001).   
4.  For related work, see Bentz et al (2002) and Bennett and Iossa (2002).  Bennett and Iossa’s model 
is based on incomplete contracts and is similar in a number of ways to the model presented here (it was 
developed independently).  In contrast, Bentz et al’s model emphasizes asymmetric information.   
5.  It is worth stressing the symmetry of the situation: it could just as well be that the government 
contracts with the provider of prison services, who then subcontracts with someone to build the prison. 
6.  In the case of a PPP, the contract can also say something about the characteristics of the prison.  
We discuss this point further below. 
7.  One can imagine that one way for the externality to be internalized is for the builder’s payment P0 to 
be made contingent on the price the government pays to the prison operator at  
date 1.  One problem with such an arrangement is that this price may not be verifiable.  In any event, we 
will see shortly that a PPP achieves a similar outcome. 
8.  Note that we have implicitly assumed that the builder has the same freedom to shade on the 
productive investment i under a PPP as under conventional provision.  This makes sense if the PPP 
contract places the same constraints on the nature of the building as under conventional provision, along 
with constraints on service quality (see footnote 6).  However, an often-mentioned benefit of a PPP is 
that one can reduce contracting costs by omitting details of the building, and focusing on service 
provision.  The problem with this is that it may give the builder the flexibility to choose a lower i under 
PPP than under conventional provision (i.e., there is a change in the constraint set that may dominate the 
incentive effect discussed in the text).  Thus PPPs that omit details of the building may have costs in 
addition to those emphasized here. 
9.  These conclusions about the relative desirability of PPPs mirror those in Grout (1997). 
10.  For some progress on this topic, however, see Ellman (1999). 